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As the secession crisis yielded the bitter fruit of civil war in the spring of 1861, Abraham
Lincoln understood well the multifaceted importance of the border states, including his native
state of Kentucky. He is said to have remarked that, while he hoped that God was on his side, he
needed Kentucky. Indeed, Union and Confederate partisans in and out of the state coveted
Kentucky’s manufacturing capacity as well as its ability to provide military resources such as
soldiers and draft animals. The state’s geographical position was vital as well. Kentucky offered
a springboard for invasion of the North or the South, and the forces that controlled the state’s
portions of the Cumberland, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers would be well positioned to drive deep
into enemy territory—a fact that Ulysses S. Grant demonstrated effectively with his seizure of
Forts Henry and Donelson in February of 1862.
Historian and journalist Berry Craig explains in his new monograph that, in light of the
aforementioned realities, Kentucky’s pro-secession newspapers struggled mightily to lead their
state out of the Union, often using humor, historical and literary references, and caustic personal
attacks in an attempt to achieve their goal. Craig acknowledges that historians have written
extensively about the Northern and Southern press during the Civil War, but he laments the
dearth of scholarship focused on border state newspapers. He then declares his intention to help
rectify this oversight by focusing on the state of Kentucky, explaining that a chief aim of his
book is to analyze “how the Confederate press [in Kentucky] argued for secession rather than
how it reported the news” (p. 8). Finally, he expresses the hope that his study will provide some
insight into the age-old question of whether the press shapes public opinion or merely reflects it.
The author scoured a host of pro-secession as well as unionist Kentucky newspapers in
pursuit of his objectives, and his opening chapter introduces the reader to some of the most
influential publications on both sides of this divide. Although he engages a wide array of papers
throughout the state, he focuses much of his attention on the two leading publications of
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Louisville, the state’s most populous city: the pro-secession Louisville Daily Courier and the
unionist Louisville Daily Journal. In many respects, the battles between these two papers and
their editors closely resembled many others that raged across the state. However, Craig notes
that, although the number of pro-secession and unionist papers was roughly equal in Kentucky
during the secession crisis and the first months of the war, public sentiment continued to be
overwhelmingly in favor of remaining in the Union during this period as well as for the duration
of the conflict. Thus, it appears that, in significant ways, the Kentucky press neither shaped
public opinion nor reflected it; the disproportionately large number of pro-secession papers in the
state convinced few in the overwhelmingly unionist majority to abandon their views.
As the balance of Craig’s book makes plain, Kentucky’s pro-Southern press shifted its
objectives and rhetoric in response to changing conditions. During the 1860 presidential
election, many pro-Southern papers rejected secession and embraced John C. Breckinridge as the
last best hope of the republic—a man who would preserve the Union and safeguard the liberties
of all Americans. Immediately following the election, these papers frequently lamented
Lincoln’s victory while at the same time pronouncing it an insufficient reason for a state to leave
the Union. Lincoln’s anti-slavery views were anathema to them (and to most Kentuckians), as
was the prospect of his administration using force to keep states in the Union against their will.
When South Carolina and the other Lower South states seceded, Kentucky’s pro-Southern press
shifted its approach to advocating for a “sovereignty convention” that they hoped would lead to
the secession of their state. The formation of the Confederacy, along with the firing on Fort
Sumter and Lincoln’s subsequent requisition for militia troops, led some erstwhile unionist
papers into the pro-secession fold and amplified calls for a Kentucky secession convention.
Unfolding events emboldened the pro-Southern press, and many papers went beyond promoting
secession to advocating Kentucky’s admission to the new Confederacy.
Significantly, Craig builds on the vital work of Charles B. Dew by illuminating the role
of Southern secession commissioners in the movement to lead Kentucky out of the Union. By
highlighting the efforts of men such as Alabamian (and Kentucky native) Stephen Foster Hale,
Craig helps to demonstrate that secession was driven primarily by the desire to preserve slavery
as the only viable guarantor of white supremacy. Kentucky’s rebel press often echoed the
racially-charged arguments of secession commissioners, hoping they would resonate with the
state’s sizable pro-slavery majority.
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Kentucky’s rebel press shifted its objectives and tactics again in light of political setbacks
in 1861. When Kentucky’s legislature declared neutrality between the belligerents in May of
1861, many rebel papers decried the move, characterizing it as a craven capitulation to a “Black
Republican” conspiracy to force Kentucky to join the Union’s war against the South. In June,
unionist candidates captured nine of the state’s ten congressional seats, and in August unionists
won an overwhelming majority in the state legislature. Although many of Kentucky’s proConfederate papers remained unaware of or, more likely, chose to ignore the state’s staunch
unionism, they could not escape the legislature’s composition and inclinations. Fearing that the
new legislature might attempt to lead Kentucky into the war on the North’s side, the rebel press
belatedly embraced neutrality as the best possible outcome for their cause.
The pro-Confederate press’s strategy to embrace neutrality and peace in order to forestall
Kentucky’s participation in the Union war effort failed miserably. The legislature allowed a
Union Army training center to operate on Kentucky soil, and when Confederate and later Union
armies invaded the state in September of 1861, state lawmakers demanded that only the
Confederates leave. With these actions, the state became an active participant in the North’s
drive to maintain the Union. Thereafter, Union forces in Kentucky suppressed rebel papers as
treasonous. The Louisville Courier, which among other things attempted to send publications on
military tactics to the South, was shut down by federal authorities and its publisher sent into
exile. A few other pro-Confederate editors were arrested, but their stints in prison were typically
brief. The remainder of the rebel press either moderated their pro-Southern tone or ceased
publishing for the duration of the war.
Craig concludes his work with a fascinating discussion of Kentucky’s post-war press,
which he characterizes as a resurrection of the wartime rebel press. The author notes that
Kentucky papers became intensely pro-Southern in the aftermath of the war, driven in large part
by emancipation—a measure widely opposed throughout the state. They became zealous
propagators of the “Lost Cause” myth, and their message found a receptive audience in a state
where many were disillusioned by the war’s ramifications. Henry Watterson, an editor and
former Confederate soldier who helped to spawn the Louisville Courier-Journal in 1868,
advocated tirelessly for his “New Departure.” This program, which anticipated Henry Woodfin
Grady’s “New South,” embraced “Lost Cause” mythology, accepted the end of slavery and
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limited rights for the freed slaves, and promoted the industrialization and diversification of the
Southern economy.
Like any human endeavor, Craig’s book is not without shortcomings, but they are
relatively minor. The author inaccurately describes Lincoln’s April 15, 1861 summons of state
militia forces as a call for 75,000 “volunteer soldiers” (p. 78), and he misleadingly asserts that
Lincoln “had not even been on the ballot in ten of the eleven future Confederate states” (p.106),
suggesting that the states rather than local political parties printed and disseminated ballots to
voters. In addition, some of Craig’s claims about public opinion in Kentucky are strained and
difficult if not impossible to support with available evidence. For example, although it may be
true that the Breckinridge press’s reaction to Lincoln’s election “mirrored the views of almost all
white Kentuckians” (p. 51), the author does not offer sufficient proof for this claim. Craig
rightly acknowledges the difficulties in determining accurate readership levels for wartime
papers, but a similar problem exists to an even greater extent in attempting to discern public
opinion regarding political questions of the era. Finally, although the author makes it clear that
he has no intention of focusing on the broad (and well-studied) question of press freedoms
during the Civil War, a more extensive consideration of how a free press (or the lack thereof) in
Kentucky related to the national landscape would have been welcome. In the final analysis,
though, Craig’s work ably fills a notable void in Civil War scholarship, and readers will enjoy
his elegant and often amusing treatment of his subject.
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